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Origins of Objectivity is Tyler Burge’s outstanding, long-awaited first 
monograph. It makes a major contribution in philosophy of percep-
tion and theory of reference and it will – no doubt – be the focus of 
much debate in the years to come. It is a wealth of philosophically 
engaging discussions as well as of empirical information ranging from 
the details of the theory of vision, to developmental psychology, 
ethology and biology. It is difficult to do it justice in the space allot-
ted. So I will start by summarizing its structure, basic methodological 
assumptions and content and I will then close by offering a critical 
assessment of some topics. 
The book is divided into three sections. The first one contains 
three chapters and lays down many of the terminological and concep-
tual distinctions which will be put to use in the remainder of the 
book. The second one consists of four chapters that analyze the vari-
ous theories about perception that have been proposed since the 
beginning of the 20th century. The third and last part of the book 
contains four chapters and develops Burge’s positive view. Further-
more, it explores the relation between the objectivity afforded in 
perception with the one arising at a conceptual level and points out its 
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relevance for an account of the epistemic status of perception and of 
beliefs based on it. 
Aims and methodological assumptions 
Burge aims to answer constitutive questions about the origins of objec-
tive representation of the world around a perceiver. However, alt-
hough the central claims are, for Burge, a priori warranted, he isn’t 
engaged merely in conceptual investigations. Rather, he “attempts to 
understand the deepest, most necessary, facts about kinds, or ‘cuts’ in 
the world, that can ground explanation” (xvi). To put it differently: 
the aim is to identify the conditions which make something what it is 
and therefore afford an explanation of its nature, or equivalently, of 
its essence (5, 57-59, 62-67, 534-7). Constitutive questions about 
objective representations of the physical world around the perceiver 
concern what it takes for a subject or an organism to “engage in 
accurate, empirical representation of an ordinary macro-physical 
subject matter” (59) so that some of its central physical attributes are 
accurately indicated and attributed “in such a way as to entail (their) 
physicality” (ibid.). 
In order to answer constitutive questions about when objectivity 
starts, two main methodological assumptions are made. The first one 
is a firmly anti-individualist conception of the mind. The second one 
consists in deploying an empirically informed methodology. Accord-
ingly, Burge rejects reductionism and looks at the best and most 
mature science concerning particularly perception to see, first, what 
conceptual categories it makes use of, and, secondly, what kind of 
data it provides us with regarding the issue of when, at the ontogenet-
ic and phylogenetic level, objective representation starts. 
The upshot is that, according to Burge, representation is an irre-
ducible and non eliminable mental kind, characterized by having 
veridicality conditions (9). That is to say, representations, by their 
very nature, have conditions for being correct or incorrect. There-
fore, they are neither reducible to other mental states which lack 
veridicality conditions, such as sensory states (ibid.); nor are they 
eliminable in favor of non psychological states such as merely causally 
reliable or information theoretic processing, or even teleological co-
variation (ibid.). Hence, representation is a psychologically robust 
kind, which, moreover, is routinely used in scientific explanations 
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(292-308). Such a psychological kind is instantiated in perception, 
thought and language. However, according to Burge, it is in percep-
tion that it makes its first appearance, as a close examination of per-
ceptual psychology reveals. Furthermore, perceptual psychology 
makes clear that perception is common to human adults, human 
infants and to a large number of creatures in the animal kingdom.  
The reason why perception is so widespread, says Burge, is that it 
doesn’t require a representation by the individual of the conditions 
which make it possible for it to have perceptual representations (11). 
Much of the positive part of the book is devoted to an understanding 
of the conditions an organism must meet in order to enjoy perceptual 
states. We will come back to them shortly. But it is important to 
stress from the start that – in keeping with Burge’s anti-individualist 
standpoint – they constitutively involve patterns of causal relations 
with the environment around a perceiver, which help determine the 
specific natures of these perceptual states. Such causal relations, 
however, are not themselves representational (61-2). 
Another important aspect of Burge’s anti-individualism consists in 
holding that it is a priori true that having any representational state 
requires bearing “certain ‘associational’ relations to some veridical 
representational states” (68). Yet, according to Burge, representa-
tions aren’t object-dependent or, more generally, referent-
dependent. Hence, contrary to what disjunctivists about perception 
hold, there can be perceptual states that “represent there being a 
particular, or (…) as of a specific attribute” (45, 362 fn. 97, 391-2), 
although there is none. Such representations aren’t veridical, but they 
are representations all the same and, moreover, are constitutively 
dependent on the fact that subjects are (or have been) in causal con-
nection with some aspects of the physical environment around them. 
Furthermore, anti-individualism helps explain why representa-
tional mental states have veridicality conditions that are non acci-
dentally fulfilled by elements in the environment (80) and, connect-
edly, why they can sometimes be erroneous. It also helps account for 
the fact that mental states such as perception have a “committal 
nature” (81). That is to say, they “undergo a kind of failure if they are 
not, or are not made, veridical” (ibid.). 
What is more, Burge claims that “the science of perceptual psy-
chology presupposes anti-individualism about perception” and hence 
it “makes anti-individualism about perception empirically specific” 
(87). For perceptual psychology contributes law-like generalizations 
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that explain “the processes by which perceptual states with specific 
veridicality conditions are formed from specific types of proximal 
stimulations” (88), as well as cases of perceptual illusion. The differ-
ence between veridical and illusory perception “often depends on 
differences in the actual, occurrent distal antecedents of a given type 
of proximal stimulation” (89). Hence, causal relations between 
perceptual states and their representata are presupposed by scientific 
explanation. 
Moreover, the central problem of perceptual psychology – the so-
called “underdetermination problem” according to which the same 
proximal stimulations are compatible with several different physical 
causes – is solved when the principles that govern the formation by 
perceptual systems of veridical perceptual states are discovered (94). 
Veridical perceptual states, in their turn, are individuated by their 
relations to environmental entities (96-8). So, the solution of the 
central problem of perceptual psychology presupposes anti-
individualism. 
Furthermore, the laws that govern perceptual systems are never 
“attributable as acts to the perceiver” (94), not even implicitly (97, 
405). They are computational formation principles, “inaccessible to 
consciousness and not under the perceiver’s control” (94). They 
operate at the subpersonal level, although their results are constitu-
tively attributable to the whole perceiver (369-76, 547-51), despite 
not being necessarily conscious. So, once more, perceptual psycholo-
gy is anti-individualist, insofar as it doesn’t require a subject to be 
able to represent the conditions which make perception possible. 
Finally, perceptual systems are domain specific, (partially) encap-
sulated from other cognitive systems, although they can interact with 
other systems, and are shared across a wide number of species. All 
these aspects further support the view that perceptual psychology is 
deeply committed to anti-individualism. 
The objectivity of perceptual representation 
The crucial issue addressed by Burge is what it means to say that 
perception affords an objective representation. “Objective” as used 
here connotes being a product of objectification, which “is formation 
of a state with a representational content that is as of a subject matter 
beyond idiosyncratic, proximal, or subjective features of the individu-
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al” (397), comprising entities in one’s physical environment, and also 
one’s own body (399). 
According to Burge, in order to perform objectification the system 
must discriminate one shape from the other, but also shapes from 
other relevant elements which are environmentally salient and could 
have an impact on the needs and activities of the perceiver. Similarly 
for the perception of bodies, which must be discriminated from 
events, properties, etc. Perception is still objective even if the per-
ceptual system is incapable of discriminating these elements from 
illusions, proximal stimulations, abstract kinds, undetached entity 
parts, etc. For the latter don’t figure as relevant alternatives in a 
causal account of the formation of the perceptual states, or figure in 
natural biological explanations of functional individual needs and 
activities. Hence, “the perceiver’s objectifying discriminatory abilities 
determine the nature and content of his perceptual abilities only 
within this larger environmental and ethological framework” (407, 
466). 
Another fundamental facet of objectification, according to Burge, 
consists in the exercise of perceptual constancies, which allow, for 
instance, to perceive a color as the same even if it is presented in 
different ways, like in the case of a white wall which is perceived as 
having the same color although it is unevenly illuminated. According 
to Burge “constancies are the perceptual analog of Fregean informa-
tive identities” (411) and are interestingly said to be “necessary and 
sufficient for the system’s being a perceptual system” (413). 
Burge discusses numerous examples of perceptual constancies in 
vision, touch and hearing. Smell and taste, by contrast, are said to 
exhibit no constancies. For such a reason, they are considered non-
perceptual sensory systems (415). There are empirical reasons for 
this, according to him: chemical blends that impinge on the olfactory 
system are amorphous, so, apparently, not stable enough to give rise 
to objectification. With taste, “the relevant mixes are proximal ones, 
in the mouth” (ibid.). Hence, once more, objectification isn’t 
achieved by the operations of the sensory system. If it is achieved at 
all, it is due to the operation of our conceptual capacities (416), 
Burge claims. 
Finally, according to him, there are natural norms governing per-
ception – viz. veridicality, accuracy and reliability. These norms are 
constitutively associated with the nature and basic function of percep-
tual representations. Hence, they are a priori knowable, by knowing 
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what perception is. They aren’t merely descriptive, for Burge (314), 
for they determine “an adequacy [condition] in fulfilling a function”; 
so a “generic notion of ‘should’ applies” to perceptual representa-
tions. One of their main features is that they need not be represented 
or in any way appreciated by the individual. However, when they are 
satisfied, an individual acquires an “entitlement” – viz. a non-
propositional warrant – for a corresponding belief, if he is capable of 
forming one (312, 317, 435). 
Perceptual contents and propositional thought 
Perceptions have representational contents. The latter are abstract 
kinds that fix conditions under which a psychological state is veridical. 
All perceptual representational contents are structured, i.e. they have 
singular and general elements. The latter perceptually indicate certain 
types or attributes – roundness, to the right of, etc. – and attribute 
them to particulars. Burge calls them “perceptual attributives” (380). 
Perception, however, singles out also particulars: not only bodies or 
events, but also specific, contextually determined, instances of prop-
erties and relations. These singular elements are labeled “singular 
perceptual applications”. Both perceptual attributives and singular 
perceptual applications are semantically relevant: the former can 
rightly or wrongly indicate types or attributes, or rightly or wrongly 
attribute them to particulars; the latter, in contrast, could fail to 
refer. 
A close examination of perceptual psychology supports the view 
that the elements of perceptual contents aren’t objects and properties 
but perceptual modes of presentation of them (385-96). Specific 
objects and properties are relevant only in order to determine wheth-
er a given perceptual representational state is veridical. 
According to Burge there is a structural difference between per-
ceptual and propositional content. The former necessarily involves 
singular, context-determined, elements, which are categorized or 
grouped from a contextually-bound perspective. Objectivity and 
singular reference are therefore already present in perception. What 
is not present yet, however, is the separation of attributions from 
singular reference, to arrive at propositional predication (539). “A 
capacity for such a separation is a central aspect of achieving the 
specific context independence and generality that are embodied in 
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pure attribution, propositional thought and rational inference” (ibid., 
541). Moreover, the content of perception is similar to a map or a 
sketch from an egocentric perspective. This is not the form of a 
proposition. In addition, while the transformations of perceptual 
states don’t depend on the individual, the transformations among 
propositions, for instance in inference, are normally acts by the 
individual. Furthermore, there is no perception of logical constants, 
while real propositional contents involve logical operations. 
Finally, perceptual attributives are limited; they concern shape, 
spatial relations, color, motion, texture, possibly danger, food, 
conspecifics, etc. Burge calls these attributives “perceptually basic” 
(546). Perceptual beliefs containing only conceptualizations of per-
ceptually basic attributives are called “basic perceptual beliefs” (ibid.). 
Many of our perceptual beliefs employ concepts which go beyond the 
range of perceptually basic ones, e.g. baseball bats, CD-players, etc. 
However, according to Burge, “in any particular application (…) the 
broader type of perceptual beliefs ultimately relies on conceptualiza-
tions of basic perceptual attributives” (546). In propositional thought 
about perceived particulars, the singular elements are inherited from 
perception and embedded in an inferential structure, which may 
involve also quantificational elements, although it need not do so. 
Origins of some representational categories: body, 
mathematical, spatial and temporal categories 
A compelling criticism of Elisabeth Spelke’s claim that bodies aren’t 
represented as such in perception allows Burge to maintain the oppo-
site. Moreover, he convincingly argues that cohesion, solidity, 
boundedness, and spatio-temporal continuity are properties which 
can be represented as such in perception.  
According to Burge, the ability to discriminate three-dimensional 
figures from a background, and of representing them as cohesive and 
bounded, together with the ability to track objects perceptually over 
time (although not necessarily in motion or behind occlusions) are “a 
priori constitutively necessary to visually representing bodies as such” 
(456, 458-9). By contrast, he thinks that perceptual attributions of 
solidity aren’t necessary to that end, even if they are sufficient for it. 
Notice, moreover, that, according to Burge, the ability to perceive 
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bodies isn’t necessary for objective perceptual representation, alt-
hough it is central to the development of our conceptual system. 
Turning to the perception of mathematical properties, Burge dis-
cusses recent experiments in this area. He doesn’t contest the fact 
that they “have shown that (…) animals and infants are sensitive to 
mathematical attributes – number, magnitude, proportion” (471). 
However, he contends that this doesn’t show that subjects enjoy 
perceptual representational states with numerical content. In particu-
lar, the widely present ability to estimate the numerosity of aggre-
gates is an exemplification of Weber’s Law, according to which, “the 
discriminability of two magnitudes is a strict function of their ratio” 
(473). So, for instance, infants around 6-7 months can discriminate 
the ratio 2/1 in aggregate sizes of 16/8, 4/2, etc. But this seems to 
be an entirely estimative or approximative capacity, which shows no 
one-one matching between members of different aggregates. “The 
fact that the capacity is sensitive to, correlates with, certain aspects of 
the natural number structure and the fact that the natural numbers 
can be approximately mapped onto the representational structure 
exhibited by the capacity do not show that the capacity represents the 
natural numbers as such, or even takes natural numbers as representata 
at all” (480), not even implicitly. Rather, according to Burge, subjects 
represent pure magnitudes as such and their ratios, and make quanti-
tative transformations among analog representations. 
Similar considerations apply to so-called “subitazing”, viz. the abil-
ity to determine, track and possibly, in adults, enumerate, 3 or 4 
bodies or dots at a glance. Again, the bottom line is that this ability 
doesn’t depend on numerical perceptual representations. Rather, it 
“appears best accounted for in terms of tracking individuals and their 
differences, or some other simple, bounded matching process. There 
need be no representational content that refers to the numbers, like 
the contents 1, 2, or 3” (485-6, figures are underlined by Burge in 
order to indicate that they would be contents of mental representa-
tions). 
Finally, spatial and temporal representations are discussed. Ac-
cording to Burge, although spatial representation is very widespread 
in the animal kingdom, it is not constitutively necessary for perceptu-
al representation. That is to say a perceptual system could represent 
the “occurrence of an attribute in space” without being able “to repre-
sent spatial relations” (497). Nevertheless, spatial perceptual repre-
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sentations, as well as representations (as) of bodies are necessary for 
higher levels of objectivity. 
Burge discusses a number of cases in which it is an open issue 
whether there is spatial perceptual representation, such as navigation 
by beaconing, by path integration, by landmark use and, lastly, by 
means of a map-like system. All of them are said not to require the 
perceptual representation of spatial relations, although they depend 
on elaborating and using information coming from spatially arranged 
elements. 
Regarding temporal representations, Burge notices that there are 
three forms of temporal sensitivity in the animal kingdom: a sense for 
temporal order, a sense for phases within cycles and, finally, sensitivi-
ty to intervals. However, according to him, none of these kinds of 
sensitivity requires a corresponding representation. In contrast, if and 
only if they play a role in perception or in representational agency, 
i.e. agency guided by perceptual representation of its goals,  they 
become represented. It is then Burge’s final contention that all per-
ception – whether or not is (as) of bodies – is a priori constitutively 
associated with temporal representation, whereas it is not constitu-
tively linked to spatial representation. 
The critique of previous accounts of the origins of 
objectivity 
If this is approximately the right picture of perception, then it is no 
surprise that all philosophical theories regarding the origins of objec-
tivity that have been proposed during the last century or so are 
deemed erroneous.2 Early analytic philosophers who embraced sense-
data theories are criticized because they “systematically conflate(d) 
objects of reference and ways that those objects are referred to or 
represented” (120). Rather, objects of perception are, when the latter 
is veridical, elements of physical reality, not mental entities. 
Peter Strawson and Gareth Evans, in contrast, are criticized for 
requiring abilities that aren’t really necessary for perception, like 
representing a comprehensive, objective spatial framework; repre-
senting a contrast between the objective and the subjective – a 
 
2 But notice that the discussion of previous accounts of perception comes be-
fore, in the text, than the presentation of Burge’s positive proposal. 
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seems/is distinction –; tracking oneself and one’s point of view 
through space; having self-consciousness; the ability to represent 
criteria for the application of the representation, or for the identifica-
tion and re-identification of the entity represented; and, lastly, the 
ability to represent causal relations and force. 
Quine’s account of perception is attacked on the grounds that it 
presupposes mastery of language in order to achieve singular refer-
ence starting from an unstructured level of representation of reality; 
in order to provide criteria of identity to single out entities; and to 
supply the quantificational apparatus which is allegedly needed in 
order to achieve singular reference. It is further criticized for accord-
ing preeminence to proximal stimulations, and for presupposing the 
ability to generalize the attributions of properties singled out in a 
specific perceptual episode. 
Finally, Davidson’s account is criticized for holding on to a mis-
leading dichotomy: that between mere sensory discrimination with-
out any genuine representation and propositional thought about one’s 
environment, which would in turn require beliefs about one’s per-
ceptual beliefs, language and even communication among individuals. 
An assessment 
Burge’s book is an invaluable contribution. In particular, I do think 
that it draws the crucial distinction between perceptual representa-
tions and sensory ones in an extremely clear and thoroughly convinc-
ing way. My partial reservations, on which I will concentrate in the 
following, should be read against the background of this judgment and 
are meant as minor criticisms, which I think leave intact the substance 
of Burge’s main claims. 
Let me start with some stylistic observations. I think the book 
would have been outstanding if the reader had been spared an exces-
sive number of repetitions, essentially due to the way the volume has 
been structured. There was no real need to introduce at great length 
some terminology and methodological issues in the first part of the 
book, in order to repeat them in the third one; or to fragment the 
discussion of the same topic in a number of places (chapter 8 is an 
example of that). It would have been better to deal with each topic 
just once and in its entirety. This would have also increased the 
eventual clarity and effectiveness of Burge’s proposal.  
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Another aspect of the book which is wanting is the fact that there 
is very little engagement with the work of other living philosophers 
who have dealt with similar topics. For instance, the idea that percep-
tion isn’t conceptual has been widely debated in philosophy in the last 
thirty years or so. There is no discussion of even the most representa-
tive views advanced so far. Some reference is made only in a footnote 
(538-9, fn 6) to Peacocke’s work on nonconceptual perceptual con-
tent. Another example is the criticism of Spelke’s claim that percep-
tion of objects requires some conceptual equipment, which has been 
present in the literature at least since Bermudez’ work in the 1990’s. 
There is, in contrast, a discussion of an overwhelming number of 
empirical cases, concerning all sorts of living creatures, some of 
which are, arguably, of modest philosophical significance and could 
have been put in an Appendix. 
A section which is far too long and also misleading at places is the 
second part of the book, where Burge discusses the views of other 
20th century philosophers regarding the origins of objectivity. Again, 
it would have benefited from a curbing and could have been placed in 
an Appendix. Let us consider just one example to see how conten-
tious this historical section may be. Burge attributes to Evans the view 
that linguistic reference is prior to other forms of reference (183-4, 
191), while it is well-known that he held the view that in order to 
understand linguistic singular reference one needs to clarify the 
structure of demonstrative and indexical reference in thought. Anoth-
er deceptive rendition of Evans’ ideas occurs when his views about 
singular thought (and his attack on the so-called “Photograph model” 
of thought) are criticized for not being an adequate account of the 
conditions perception of particulars should meet. Burge’s criticism 
seems to conflate these two levels and to be based on taking Evans’ 
remarks about the former to carry over to the latter (184-7, 198-
208). However, Evans’ views were intended to apply merely to 
singular thought. Another extremely contentious interpretation crops 
up when Evans’ defense of Russell’s principle is criticized for requir-
ing too complex cognitive abilities (172-176, 181, 192 fn. 103). The 
criticism misses the point insofar as it doesn’t adequately deal with 
the fact that merely perceptual discriminatory abilities aren’t suffi-
cient, for Evans, for proper reference in thought, while they are 
trivially enough for mere perceptual discrimination of particulars. 
This connects with Burge’s criticism of Evans’ Generality Constraint: 
singular concepts need to meet it, according to Evans, but this is not to 
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say that perception of particulars isn’t possible if that constraint isn’t 
met. Again, Burge’s criticism seems to be based on taking Evans to be 
stating a requirement upon the perception of particulars, instead of 
one on thought about them. Finally, when Burge attacks Evans’ views 
about singular thought for requiring more than mere perceptual 
discrimination of particulars, the alternative proposal isn’t clear at all. 
For it amounts to the idea that a perceptual mode of presentation 
should, as such, be utilized within propositional structures and pat-
terns of propositional inference (169-70, 179, 197-9). But it is far 
from obvious that such a mode of presentation, which, for Burge, 
isn’t propositional, and is something like a map of the perceptual 
scene as given to the subject, could figure per se in a proposition, 
which, in its turn, could enter propositional inferences. Perhaps 
Evans was wrong to impose the constraints he identified for singular 
thought, but Burge’s alternative picture seems too sketchy to vindi-
cate the view that simply perceptual discriminatory abilities are 
enough to enable singular, propositional thought. Indeed the parts of 
Burge’s book which deal with the upper bound of perceptual refer-
ence (539-546), viz. thought about particulars perceived, are 
amongst the least developed ones, and occasionally postpone relevant 
discussions to future work. This is, in contrast, one topic which 
should have been dealt with in this book, insofar as Burge’s main 
contention is that objective reference starts in perception. For many, 
while perception may be of objects and as of objects (or other attribu-
tives) unaided by concepts, reference properly so-regarded would 
start in thought, when subjects are able to entertain propositions and 
make inferences among propositional contents. This, in turn, would 
require further abilities besides the ones mobilized in perception, 
especially if, as Burge himself holds, thought is conceived as constitu-
tively detachable from contextual restrictions and connected to 
general inferential abilities. 
But let us now turn to some aspects of Burge’s positive proposal. 
Let me repeat that his way of drawing the distinction between per-
ceptual states and other sensory states with no correctness conditions 
is clear and illuminating. Methodologically, however, it is supported 
not just by a priori considerations but also – I would say, mostly – by 
an analysis of scientific data. Now, Burge is the first one to notice that 
scientists often use the term “representation” for states which don’t 
have veridicality conditions and that, quite often, even when they are 
trafficking in psychological states which, according to Burge, do have 
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them, they don’t recognize it. So, in effect, Burge is offering a rational 
reconstruction of scientific practice. The suspicion, however, remains 
that his way of drawing the distinction between perceptual states and 
other, allegedly non-representational ones, no matter how philosoph-
ically illuminating it may be, might not be underwritten – or under-
written in toto – by science itself. (To my mind this wouldn’t diminish 
its interest, but Burge may dissent). 
Another minor perplexity regarding Burge’s methodology vis-à-vis 
scientific findings is that he bases most of his considerations on an 
analysis of data coming from visual psychology. The propounded view 
that taste and smell aren’t perceptual, but merely sensory systems, 
appears comparatively less empirically substantiated. Obviously this 
thesis is going to be hostage to further empirical findings. Let me 
register, however, that it has some surprising consequences. For 
instance, that any time there are taste and smell constancies they 
aren’t actually supplied by the relevant sensory system, but by the 
exercise of concepts. This would presumably deprive a-conceptual 
creatures of the possibility of tasting the same taste, say, even when it 
is presented differently in the various areas of the mouth. This isn’t 
obvious, though. Equally surprising is the consequence that salmons’ 
navigation by beaconing, which is based on registering and following 
olfactory traces, wouldn’t be perceptual, because there is no objec-
tive representation of its direction, let alone of its final destination. 
Rather, it would be based on merely following one’s proximal olfac-
tory stimuli, in which no exercise of perceptual constancies is de-
ployed, according to Burge. But, again, this seems odd and could be 
empirically disconfirmed. After all, salmons seem to move back to 
where the same olfactory trace is more strongly registered and this 
seems to entail the exercise of something like a perceptual constancy: 
despite differences in proximal stimuli, the smell seems to be taken to 
be the same and “re-traced” on the basis of that representation, or so 
one might surmise. Let me stress that none of this ultimately speaks 
against Burge’s general account of perception, although it shows that 
some of his more specific claims might in the end be empirically 
disconfirmed. 
As noted before, Burge doesn’t provide an account of the condi-
tions which must be fulfilled to go from a perceptual representation 
to the corresponding representation in thought. In this connection, 
one further potential problem stems from the fact that for him the 
range of perceptually basic attributives is very limited. Therefore, 
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anything which goes beyond them is due, according to Burge, to the 
exercise of concepts. First, it isn’t clear whether the exercise of these 
concepts would take place in perception, so that most of adult human 
beings’ perceptions would then turn out to be conceptual after all; or 
else in judgment. I was unable to find decisive evidence in favor of 
either claim.3 Be that as it may, one might think that several crea-
tures, to whom we may not want to attribute the possession of con-
cepts, could have finer-grained perceptions than the ones immediately 
licensed by the perceptual attributives countenanced by Burge, which 
are operative in shaping their fine-grained discriminative behavior. 
So, it seems that either the range of perceptual attributives is actually 
finer-grained than Burge makes it seem, or else, that we should 
attribute more concepts to creatures than we might, at least prima 
facie, feel disposed to. Either way, Burge’s position would call for 
some refinement or clarification. 
This issue connects with Burge’s epistemological preferred view. 
As is well-known, he thinks that there are perceptual entitlements, 
i.e. externalist, non-propositional warrants that subjects need not be 
able to articulate, but that they possess when their beliefs are appro-
priately based on their perceptions. Now, it isn’t clear whether only 
beliefs that perfectly match the corresponding perceptual contents 
would be so warranted; or else whether also the ones which are 
compatible with those contents are.4 If the former, then we would 
have entitlements only for very generic beliefs, such as “Here is an 
orange round object”. Entitlements, however, seemed to promise the 
possibility of saying that children, who may be unable to articulate 
their reasons, could nevertheless have a lot of warranted beliefs, 
much more than the very generic ones which would wholly match the 
content of their perceptions. If the latter, in contrast, we may be 
entitled to hold too many, often mutually incompatible beliefs at 
once. For “Here is an orange”, “Here is an orange ball” or “Here’s a 
round and orange candle”, would all seem to be equally compatible 
with the perceptual content specifiable as round-orange-small-sized-
object. 
 
3 In “Perceptual entitlement” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67/3, pp. 
503-548) Burge seems to favor the former option (cf. p. 546). 
4 In “Perceptual entitlement”, op. cit., Burge seems to favor the latter option. 
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Again, a problematic aspect of Burge’s position with respect to 
perception, when taken in connection with epistemology, is that he 
doesn’t require perception to be conscious. So it appears that 
blindsight, for instance, would be a case of perception. Since, appar-
ently, it is reliable, one may well conclude that subjects who form 
beliefs on its basis are justified to do so, even if obviously unable to 
articulate their warrant, of which they are also totally unaware. But 
this is difficult to swallow. For the belief that, say, there is a ball on 
their left, seems to be a lucky shot in the dark, from their own point 
of view. So, although one may be hospitable to the idea that not all 
justifications need be propositional and articulable by subjects who 
have them, one may at least require that justifications, even in the 
form of entitlements, should depend on subjects’ conscious mental 
states. 
Finally, let me turn to Burge’s claim that there are natural norms 
– that pertain to the essence of the entities at issue – about represen-
tation and perception that can be known a priori, such as the fact that 
(perceptual) representations are veridical (let alone accurate and 
reliable). Furthermore, that it is knowable a priori that in order to 
have certain contents representations require being, or having been 
(perhaps only phylogenetically) in appropriate relational states with 
what would make those contents correct.  
I must confess, first, that I am not persuaded that these allegedly 
natural norms would be knowable a priori, i.e. either by reflection on 
the notion of representation or of perceptual representation. It seems 
plausible that representations in general just present a possible layout 
of objects, properties or states of affairs, in whatever modality they 
specifically do that (either in perception, or in thought or even in 
imagination, just to stick to mental representations). So it seems 
reasonable to hold that there is nothing in the very concept of repre-
sentation that suggests its being a norm that representations should be 
veridical. Secondly, it isn’t obvious to me that, in order to have a 
representation with a specific representational content, one must be 
(or have been, perhaps only phylogenetically) in appropriate causal 
relations with what would make that content correct. This form of 
anti-individualism about content doesn’t seem to me to be underwrit-
ten just by reflection on the notion of representational content (not 
even of perceptual representational content, given that, as Burge 
himself acknowledges, there may be perceptual representations with 
the same content even when they aren’t produced by a distal cause), 
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while I remain hospitable to more local forms of anti-individualism 
about, for instance, natural kinds’ thought. 
From this different point of view, the norm of veridicality (let alone 
those of accuracy and reliability) in the perceptual domain would seem to 
depend on having found out empirically the standard way in which most 
organisms with similar sensory systems, in approximately the same 
conditions, would represent the environment as being. Such an empiri-
cally determined standard would then help adjudicate which representa-
tions are correct and which aren’t. This is fine as far as it goes, but – to 
stress – it doesn’t seem to be knowable by means of a priori reflection, 
let alone by reflection on the very concept of representation. 
Of course one might say I have been unfair to Burge because the natu-
ral norms he is concerned with are, first and foremost, those regarding 
perceptual representations. One might then stress that since perceptual 
verbs are factive, the key norm of perception is to represent correctly. 
Obviously, down this route, at least that norm could be known a priori, 
by reflection on our own concept of perceptual representation (but what 
about the norms of accuracy and reliability?). However, I think that in 
such a case we could hardly take ourselves to have disclosed the very 
essence of perception as opposed to the way in which we tend to think 
about it, or represent it as being.  
Despite these criticisms, however, I think that Origins of Objectivity is a 
rich and fundamental book. It is also an example of a really interdiscipli-
nary approach to perception and reference. It is therefore a must both for 
philosophers and psychologists interested in these topics. It remains that 
some important issues with respect to its overall methodology, percep-
tion’s lower and upper bound, the relationship between perceptions and 
concepts and perception’s epistemic role still need to be thoroughly 
clarified. No doubt, Burge’s future writings will fill in these lacunae.5 
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5 Burge’s Jean Nicod Lectures delivered in 2010 go in this direction, especially as 
far as perception’s upper bound and its epistemic role are concerned. 
